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Genetic Stalking and Voyeurism: A New 
Challenge to Privacy 
Mark A. Rothstein∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A new website has just been launched with the URL of 
www.celebritygenetics.com (“Celebrity Genetics”).1  Designed to appeal 
to the public’s seemingly insatiable appetite for information about 
celebrities,2 Celebrity Genetics sells genetic information about hundreds 
of entertainers, politicians, athletes, and other public figures.  For a fee 
ranging from twenty dollars to several hundred dollars, individuals and 
commercial publishers (such as blogs and tabloids) can purchase genetic 
information about selected celebrities, such as relatedness to other 
celebrities (e.g., paternity); ancestral place of origin; cognitive ability; 
behavioral genetic profile (e.g., genetic contribution to sexual 
orientation, propensity to addiction, and degree of risk-seeking 
behavior); and predisposition to various illnesses. 
The analysis of celebrity DNA samples is merely the latest 
application of new genetic technologies to test individuals without 
consent and for purposes other than health care.3  In the late 1980s, law 
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 1. This is a hypothetical website.  The author owns the domain name, 
www.celebritygenetics.com, to prevent its use by others for commercial purposes.  Of course, 
numerous similar domain names are available.  Even if no commercial website is ever created, the 
genetic privacy issues raised by the nonconsensual testing of non-celebrities are important to 
consider. 
 2. See generally CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION: MEDIA, PRIVACY, AND PEERING IN 
MODERN CULTURE (2004). 
 3. A detailed discussion of Internet-based DNA testing for health-related purposes is beyond 
the scope of this Article.  It should be noted, however, that several other forms of Internet-based 
DNA testing for health purposes have generated considerable controversy.  Examples of DNA 
testing for health purposes include genome-wide association studies, see generally Mark I. 
McCarthy et al., Genome-Wide Association Studies for Complex Traits: Consensus, Uncertainty and 
Challenges, 9 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 356 (2008); pharmacogenomics, see generally S.H. 
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enforcement officials began matching DNA left at crime scenes with 
samples donated to police by suspects, often in “DNA dragnets,” to 
identify serial murderers and rapists.4  Soon thereafter, law enforcement 
officers began obtaining DNA samples from suspects without consent 
and, in some cases, surreptitiously or by ruse from licked envelopes and 
stamps,5 soft drink cans,6 cigarette butts,7 chewing gum,8 and other 
objects.9 
At about the same time, fathers with child support obligations who 
were suspicious of their child’s paternity were urged by billboard 
advertising and other mass marketing techniques to have DNA testing of 
themselves and their children (without the knowledge or consent of the 
child’s mother) to confirm or rebut their paternity.10  At first, the 
“doubtful dads” brought their children to genetic testing laboratories for 
the sample collection.11  Soon thereafter, online entrepreneurs began  
 
 
                                                                                                                       
Katsanis, G. Javitt & K. Hudson, A Case Study of Personalized Medicine, 320 SCIENCE 53 (2008); 
and nutrigenomics, see generally Katrina A.B. Goddard et al., Awareness and Use of Direct-to-
Consumer Nutrigenomic Tests, United States, 2006, 9 GENETICS IN MED. 510 (2007). 
 4. See Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, The Expanding Use of DNA in Law 
Enforcement: What Role for Privacy?, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 153, 155–56 (2006) (describing the 
use of DNA dragnets).  See generally JOSEPH WAMBAUGH, THE BLOODING (1989) (describing the 
first forensic use of a DNA technique developed by Alec Jeffreys to identify a serial rapist in 
England).  The seizure and analysis of abandoned objects by law enforcement officials to prevent 
and solve crimes is generally lawful, see infra notes 25–39 and accompanying text, but in some 
circumstances DNA analysis by law enforcement officials may be so extensive or invasive as to 
raise privacy concerns.  Among the more controversial applications of DNA testing in law 
enforcement are DNA dragnets (testing all individuals—usually all men—in a geographic area), 
Rothstein & Talbott, supra, at 155–56, indirect testing of suspects by obtaining the DNA of relatives 
(including their children), id. at 156, low stringency searches where there is an incomplete match, id. 
at 156–57, and analysis of genetic material stored in health care facilities, id. at 157–58.  Thus, 
regardless of the constitutionality of the law enforcement practices, aggressive and expansive use of 
DNA testing may not be sound policy. 
 5. E.g., State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 31–32 (Wash. 2007). 
 6. E.g., Hudson v. State, 205 S.W.3d 600, 602 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). 
 7. E.g., Commonwealth v. Perkins, 883 N.E.2d 230, 237 (Mass. 2008); State v. Reed, 641 
S.E.2d 320, 321 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). 
 8. E.g., People v. LaGuerre, 815 N.Y.S.2d 211, 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). 
 9. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelreid & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected 
Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 436–40 (2001) (describing other surreptitious DNA collection 
methods); Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic 
Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2006) (same); Amy Harmon, Lawyers Fight DNA Samples 
Gained on Sly, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2008, at A1 (same). 
 10. See Dorothy Nelkin, Paternity Palaver in the Media: Selling Identity Tests, in GENETIC 
TIES AND THE FAMILY: THE IMPACT OF PATERNITY TESTING ON PARENTS AND CHILDREN 3, 5 (Mark 
A. Rothstein et al. eds., 2005) (noting paternity tests were advertised on taxicabs in New York City 
and billboards in Baltimore). 
 11. See id. (stating laboratories receive calls and visits from men seeking to resolve suspicions 
about the fidelity of their wives). 
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advertising paternity testing services using home-collection kits 
involving cheek swabs, which captured buccal cells in saliva.12 
It was not long before an “anything goes” atmosphere permeated the 
Internet world of DNA-based parentage testing—and the trend has 
continued unabated.  For a fee, virtually any source of DNA that can be 
tested will be tested—with or without consent.  For example, one web-
based laboratory13 offers a list of items it will test and the cost for each, 
including the following: chewed chewing gum ($240—Wrigley Juicy 
Fruit is claimed to work best); cigarette butts ($240—six should be sent); 
hard candy ($300—well-sucked lollipops are preferred); used condoms 
($300); semen stains on clothing ($300);14 used tampons or feminine 
pads ($240); sweaty hats or ball caps ($300); “hocked loogies” ($300—
best if uninfected); plucked hair ($240—three to ten strands); Q-tips with 
ear wax ($300—up to three swabs); snotty Kleenex ($300—best if full of 
mucus); and fecal matter ($360—must be frozen immediately).15 
Celebrity Genetics thus entered an already sleazy world of covert 
genetic analysis to offer yet another unsavory DNA testing service.  
Unlike testing for personal use, however, Celebrity Genetics assumes 
that the test results will generate widespread commercial interest.  
Celebrity Genetics’ business depends on maintaining interest in the 
genetic information of celebrities and replenishing the supply of DNA 
                                                          
 12. Id. at 6.  By 2000, laboratories accredited by the American Association of Blood Banks 
performed over 300,000 DNA-based paternity tests, and the number of tests performed by the 
numerous unaccredited laboratories is unknown.  AM. ASS’N OF BLOOD BANKS, ANNUAL REPORT 
SUMMARY FOR TESTING IN 2004, at 3, 12 (2004), available at http://www.aabb.org/Documents/ 
Accreditation/Parentage_Testing_Accreditation_Program/rtannrpt04.pdf.  The results of DNA test-
ing based on home-collection kits are inadmissible in court because, among other things, there is no 
way to verify the source of the specimens.  See Mary R. Anderlik, Assessing the Quality of DNA-
Based Parentage Testing: Findings from a Survey of Laboratories, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 291, 295, 299 
(2003) (noting home-test results cannot be used for “any official purpose”).  If the “unofficial” test 
result indicates misattributed paternity, however, a petition can be filed for court-ordered testing.  
See id. at 308 (noting some people use tests to confirm paternity before entering into court 
proceedings). 
 13. DNA Home Test or Forensic Acceptable Samples, http://www.dnatestingcentre.com/ 
samples.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2008). 
 14. Surreptitious testing for the presence of semen on linens, clothing, and other objects has 
been touted as a basis for “infidelity” testing.  See Semen and Sperm Detection, Inc., http:// 
www.semen-detection.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2008). 
 15. According to published reports, when the President of the United States travels abroad, he 
uses a special toilet, which is then flown back to Washington to be emptied.  The goal is to prevent 
foreign countries from performing genetic testing or other analyses of his fecal matter, something 
allegedly done in the past on foreign rulers.  Paul Krassner, Excrement in the News, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST, July 6, 2006, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-krassner/excrement-in-the-
news_b_24536.html (describing the security measures taken to protect the President’s medical 
conditions).  As a practical matter, it would seem an impossible task to prevent anyone’s DNA from 
being obtained.  The President would need to have his own glassware, utensils, and other objects, 
and practically live in a bubble, which would not be conducive to diplomacy. 
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for analysis, and the company uses an ingenious method to do both.  
Celebrity Genetics’ website has a section called “DNA Wanted.”  
Hundreds of celebrities are listed, each with a price or bounty for the first 
collector who submits a sample of the celebrity’s DNA.  As a result, 
Celebrity Genetics has created an army of thousands of amateur “gene-
arazzi” from all over the world who hope to (and in some cases, do) 
make money and achieve fleeting notoriety by obtaining and selling the 
DNA of listed celebrities.  The Celebrity Genetics website does not 
specify the method of sample collection; it merely lists some suitable 
items for DNA testing, such as used chewing gum and cigarette butts. 
In attempting to verify that the DNA sample submitted is that of the 
celebrity claimed, the collector uses a cell phone or camera to obtain a 
digital image of the celebrity using a particular object (for example, a 
napkin in a restaurant).  Then the collector places the object in a special 
mailing envelope sold by Celebrity Genetics to the DNA sleuths.  Once 
received, the DNA is analyzed and the results are offered for sale on the 
Celebrity Genetics website.16  In their frenzy to obtain samples, DNA 
collectors in Hollywood, Cannes, Monte Carlo, Washington, Beijing, and 
other places have scavenged through the trash cans of political 
candidates, movie stars, judicial nominees, and Olympic athletes; 
pilfered napkins and utensils from chic restaurants; bribed bartenders and 
chambermaids for used glasses, towels, and linens; stolen dirty clothes 
from laundries and dry cleaners; and vandalized barber and beauty 
shops.17  Privacy advocates and various celebrities have voiced concerns 
about the intrusions and disruptions in obtaining the DNA, and in 
publication of the test results.18 
Are Celebrity Genetics and its inevitable “copy-cat” websites merely 
the harmless, twenty-first century versions of gossip columns and tabloid 
photographs from an earlier era?  Or does this phenomenon represent an 
insidious infringement on the rights of individuals to be let alone and to 
                                                          
 16. New automated DNA testing methods make it feasible to test simultaneously for hundreds 
of thousands of single nucleotide polymorphisms which, to varying degrees, may be associated with 
an increased likelihood of various health and behavioral outcomes.  See McCarthy et al., supra note 
3, at 367 (“Genome wide association (GWA) studies are proving adept at identifying common 
variants contributing to the inherited component of common diseases.”). 
 17. When Britney Spears had her hair shaved at Esther Tognozzi’s salon in Los Angeles, her 
hair and the clippers used to cut it were reportedly offered for sale on e-Bay.  Lisa Ingrassia, After 
the Shave: Britney Goes Clubbing, PEOPLE, Feb. 20, 2007, http://www.people.com/people/article/ 
0,,20012318,00.html; International Biosciences, DNA Testing—The Secrets of Celebrity, 
http://www.ibdna.com/regions/UK/EN/?page=secretsOfCelebrity (last visited July 18, 2008). 
 18. See, e.g., June Mary Z. Makdisi, Genetic Privacy: New Intrusion a New Tort?, 34 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 965, 971–72 (2001) (“[E]xcluding others from probing one’s unique genetic 
make-up is vital to maintaining dignity through privacy.”). 
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prevent their intimate personal health information from being 
involuntarily generated, publicized, and exploited?19 
This Article considers whether individuals—celebrity or not—have 
or should have constitutional, statutory, or common law rights to prevent 
the seizure, analysis, and publication of genetic information without their 
consent.  Part II of the Article discusses the constitutional issues 
associated with taking and analyzing objects containing DNA, including 
abandoned property.  Part III considers the applicability of common law 
actions for invasion of privacy and conversion.  Next, Part IV analyzes 
state genetic privacy laws.  Part V assesses the policy options for dealing 
with this emerging issue, including illustrative federal and foreign laws, 
and presents a preliminary legislative agenda.  Finally, Part VI concludes 
by observing what a future world without genetic privacy would be like. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Constitutional law is a logical starting point for analyzing privacy 
law because the Constitution has long been the source of rights involving 
individual autonomy, marriage, procreation, and medical privacy.20  
Although constitutional law is unlikely to provide a remedy in cases of 
genetic stalking by private parties, constitutional case law may be 
relevant in developing legislative and common law approaches to the 
issue.21  In general, the basic constitutional issue is whether individuals 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an object containing DNA so 
as to implicate the protections of the Fourth Amendment,22 the  
 
                                                          
 19. Other forms of nonconsensual genetic testing, or “genetic stalking,” are taking place.  For 
example, some individuals doing genealogical research who are unsuccessful in obtaining biological 
specimens with the consent of relatives, stalk the relatives to collect and test samples from discarded 
objects.  In one reported incident, an individual took hairs from her deceased grandmother in her 
casket.  Laura A. Matejik, DNA Sampling: Privacy and Police Investigation in a Suspect Society, 61 
ARK. L. REV. 53, 81 (2008) (citing Amy Harmon, Stalking Strangers’ DNA to Fill in the Family 
Tree, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Apr. 2, 2007, at A01). 
 20. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 10.1.1, at 792 
(3d ed. 2006). 
 21. See id. § 11.3.5.5, at 1060–61 (explaining the Supreme Court’s analysis of liability for 
invasion of privacy when information is obtained by a nongovernment source and the likelihood the 
Court will revisit this issue). 
 22. The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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Fourteenth Amendment,23 or comparable provisions of state 
constitutions.24 
The cases with facts closest to genetic stalking involve police seizing 
abandoned property and using it as evidence in a criminal prosecution.  
In the leading case of California v. Greenwood, a police investigator, 
suspecting that an individual was engaged in drug trafficking, asked the 
suspect’s regular municipal trash collector to pick up the plastic trash 
bags that the suspect left on the curb in front of his house and give them 
to the police without mixing them with other trash bags.25  The trash 
collector gave the police the suspect’s trash bags every week for at least 
two months.26  No warrant was obtained by the police to search the 
bags,27 which contained “items indicative of narcotics use.”28  The police 
used this evidence to obtain warrants to search the house, where they 
found cocaine and hashish.29 
In reversing the dismissal of the case in state court, the Supreme 
Court upheld the search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.30  The 
Court, in an opinion by Justice White, held that the defendants did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their garbage.31  “It is 
common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a 
public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, 
snoops, and other members of the public.”32  The Court included a 
footnote about the practice of some tabloid journalists of combing 
through the garbage outside the home of Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger.33  In dissent, Justice Brennan asserted that because “[s]crutiny 
of another’s trash is contrary to commonly accepted notions of civilized 
behavior,” it is reasonable to expect that one’s garbage will not be 
subject to search.34  “The mere possibility that unwelcome meddlers 
might open and rummage through the containers does not negate the 
                                                          
 23. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures as being applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); see also 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, § 6.3.3. 
 24. See infra notes 40–46 and accompanying text. 
 25. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988). 
 26. Id. at 45 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 38 (majority opinion). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 39. 
 31. Id. at 40–41. 
 32. Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted). 
 33. Id. at 40 n.4. 
 34. Id. at 45–46 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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expectation of privacy in their contents any more than the possibility of a 
burglary negates an expectation of privacy in the home . . . .”35 
The holding in Greenwood, however, is not limited to trash; it is part 
of a more general proposition that individuals have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in abandoned property.36  For example, in Abel v. 
United States, an FBI agent searched a hotel room after a suspect had 
paid his bill and vacated the room.37  There, in a wastepaper basket, the 
agent found a “cipher pad” used in espionage.38  The Supreme Court held 
that the evidence was lawfully seized because the defendant had 
abandoned it.39 
In contrast to Supreme Court precedent, some state courts have 
interpreted their state constitutions to be more protective of the right of 
privacy in abandoned property.  For example, in State v. Goss,40 the 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire considered a case with facts virtually 
identical to Greenwood.  The police seized and searched the trash of an 
individual suspected of growing marijuana in his house.41  The trash was 
in black plastic bags left on a driveway about three feet from the road on 
a regular trash pick-up day.42  The bags contained “a wire scraper on 
which there was charred material that tested positive for presumptive 
marijuana presence.”43  Based on this evidence, the police obtained a 
warrant to search the defendant’s house, where they found marijuana.44  
The court expressly declined to apply Greenwood to New Hampshire’s 
state constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures because it did “not believe that conveying trash to a trash 
collector for disposal renders an expectation of privacy in the trash 
unreasonable.”45  New Hampshire thereby joined a minority of courts in 
holding that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in trash left for 
collection by regular trash collectors.46 
                                                          
 35. Id. at 54. 
 36. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 2.6(b) (3d ed. 1996). 
 37. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 224–25 (1960). 
 38. Id. at 220, 225. 
 39. Id. at 241. 
 40. 834 A.2d 316 (N.H. 2003). 
 41. Id. at 317. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 319. 
 46. See, e.g., State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276–77 (Haw. 1985); State v. Hempele, 576 
A.2d 793, 800–02 (N.J. 1990); State v. Granville, 142 P.3d 933, 938–41 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006); State 
v. Morris, 680 A.2d 90, 94 (Vt. 1996); State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112, 1116 (Wash. 1990).  Contra 
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Constitutional case law is not directly applicable to the issue of 
genetic stalking.  First, there is the matter of state (or governmental) 
action.  Federal constitutional requirements under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments are relevant only when the government is 
conducting the search and seizure.47  Second, there are six states with 
constitutional privacy protections applicable to both public and private 
actors.48  Although these states prohibit unreasonable searches and 
seizures by both governmental and private actors,49 it is not clear whether 
taking and analyzing abandoned property would be considered 
unreasonable in these states.50  Finally, there is the matter of fashioning 
an appropriate remedy.  In genetic stalking, often the person seizing the 
property will be the least easily identifiable and least solvent party.  
Consequently, aggrieved individuals and policy makers should look 
beyond constitutional search and seizure law to address the issue of 
nonconsensual genetic testing and publication of the results. 
III. COMMON LAW 
A. Invasion of Privacy 
In 1890, two young law partners from Boston, Samuel D. Warren 
and Louis D. Brandeis, published a seminal article on the right to privacy 
at common law.51  According to most historians, the impetus for the 
article was Warren’s concern about the allegedly intrusive social 
reporting of the Boston press, but it is not clear what, if any, specific 
stories aroused his ire.52  Brandeis collaborated with Warren to write 
                                                                                                                       
People v. Hillman, 834 P.2d 1271, 1276 (Colo. 1992); Commonwealth v. Pratt, 555 N.E.2d 559, 
567–68 (Mass. 1990); State v. Carriere, 545 N.W.2d 773, 776 (N.D. 1996).  For a listing of the state 
decisions on the issue, see Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Searches and Seizures: Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy in Contents of Garbage or Trash Receptacle, 62 A.L.R.5th 1, 11–17 (1998). 
 47. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 
(1883) (“Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth 
A]mendment.”); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, § 6.4.1 (“The Constitution’s protections of 
individual liberties and its requirement for equal protection apply only to the government.  Private 
conduct generally does not have to comply with the Constitution.”). 
 48. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. 
I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 49. See, e.g., Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1230 (Cal. 1997) (discussing Hill v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994), which held that drug testing by private 
employers is subject to the state constitution’s privacy provision). 
 50. Washington is the only state that appears to clearly reject Greenwood and also to extend 
constitutional privacy protection beyond governmental actors, but there is no case law in 
Washington on whether this would extend to abandoned property. 
 51. LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS 33 (1983). 
 52. Id. at 33–35.  A recent article documents that between 1882, the date of his “society” 
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their influential and legendary law review article, The Right to Privacy.53  
Although it was inspired by perceived abuses by the press, Warren and 
Brandeis argued more broadly in favor of a comprehensive common law 
right of individuals to be free from unwanted and unreasonable intrusions 
of their “inviolate personality.”54 
Warren and Brandeis expanded on Judge Thomas M. Cooley’s 
notion of privacy as “the right ‘to be let alone.’”55  They proposed a 
general legal principle of protecting “the privacy of private life”56 and 
urged creating a cause of action to redress “the more flagrant breaches of 
decency and propriety.”57  They concluded their article by observing the 
irony between the different standards used by the law in dealing with 
public and private interferences with peaceful habitation: “The common 
law has always recognized a man’s house as his castle, impregnable, 
often, even to its own officers engaged in the execution of its commands.  
Shall the courts thus close the front entrance to constituted authority, and 
open wide the back door to idle or prurient curiosity?”58 
Despite its well-deserved acclaim in the academic literature, the 
Warren and Brandeis article did not immediately translate into a concrete 
common law doctrine that could be invoked to redress private wrongs.59  
Beginning in the 1930s, courts in several states began to recognize a 
right of privacy, but the contours of the right were not well defined.60  
The task of developing a cohesive doctrine fell to William L. Prosser 
who, in a famous law review article in 1960, proposed that the common 
law right to privacy was actionable in tort in four discrete situations: 
 
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private 
affairs. 
                                                                                                                       
engagement to Mabel Bayard, daughter of U.S. Senator Thomas F. Bayard, and the 1890 publication 
of The Right to Privacy, there were approximately sixty newspaper stories from Boston, New York, 
and Washington, D.C., reporting on the personal life of Warren and his family.  Amy Gajda, What if 
Samuel D. Warren Hadn’t Married a Senator’s Daughter?: Uncovering the Press Coverage that Led 
to “The Right to Privacy,” 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 35, 44. 
 53. 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 54. Id. at 205. 
 55. Id. at 195 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)). 
 56. Id. at 215. 
 57. Id. at 215–16. 
 58. Id. at 220. 
 59. Brandeis, who was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Woodrow Wilson in 1916, 
also became famous for his defense of the right to privacy against governmental intrusion.  See 
generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 643 
(2006–07).  A hallmark of his privacy jurisprudence is his majestic dissent in Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 471–85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).  Chemerinsky, supra, at 645. 
 60. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 851 (5th ed. 1984). 
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2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 
4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name 
or likeness.61 
Some scholars have argued that, in carving out limited categories of 
protected interests, Prosser engaged in reductionism and 
oversimplification of the human dignity embodied in the right to 
privacy.62  Nevertheless, the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted 
Prosser’s classifications,63 and the limited, categorical approach to 
common law torts for invasion of privacy steadily gained widespread 
acceptance in the United States.64 
All four of the prototypical common law invasions of privacy are 
implicated by genetic stalking and voyeurism, but not every jurisdiction 
recognizes all four types of invasion of privacy.  Even in jurisdictions 
that do, it is not clear that courts would be prepared to apply invasion of 
privacy to the acts of obtaining, analyzing, and disclosing the genetic 
information of celebrities or “ordinary” individuals without their consent. 
1. Intrusion upon Seclusion 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the tort of intrusion upon 
seclusion as follows: “One who intentionally intrudes, physically or 
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs 
or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, 
if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”65  The 
intrusion may be physical (as by entering a home without permission), 
electronic (as by wiretapping or electronically eavesdropping), or may 
occur by prying into private affairs (as by unauthorized scrutiny of an 
individual’s bank records).66  Although the Restatement provides that no 
                                                          
 61. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 62. See, e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1002–03 (1964) (“[T]he loss suffered is not one which may be 
made good by an award of damages.  The injury is to our individuality, to our dignity as 
individuals . . . .”); see also Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering 
the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 151–52, 156–58 (2007) (arguing that the breach of 
confidence action was a significant omission from Prosser’s categories). 
 63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A–652E (1977).  Prosser and John W. Wade 
were the reporters for the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
 64. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1197–98 (2000); see KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, at 
849–51. 
 65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 66. KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, at 854–55. 
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physical intrusion is required,67 some courts have held to the contrary.68  
According to one formulation, “[p]eeping and eavesdropping are prime 
examples” of intrusion.69  Two key factors used by the courts in 
determining the unreasonableness of the intrusion are the method used 
and the purpose of the defendant’s conduct.70 
In the context of genetic stalking,71 there are four important 
considerations.  First, it is necessary to determine the act of intrusion.  If 
there has not been any trespass to property, trespass to chattel, or 
conversion in the acquisition of the object to be tested, it would be more 
difficult to argue that there has been intrusion upon seclusion.  Thus, 
where an interested party merely took a piece of abandoned property 
from a public place (e.g., a piece of used gum or a cigarette butt from a 
sidewalk), courts are likely to hold that there has not been any intrusion 
into an individual’s legally protectable interest.  If there is an intrusion in 
this scenario, it must be from the act of performing DNA testing on the 
object without consent.72  Such a “dignitary” as opposed to “property” 
view of intrusion,73 independent of any physical intrusion or the 
widespread disclosure of the test results, is based on the sensitive nature 
of the information revealed by the DNA testing.  Although there is no 
case law in support of this approach, the courts have yet to be presented 
with facts involving genetic stalking. 
Second, the courts have been reluctant to find an intrusion upon 
seclusion for conduct occurring in a public place because an individual 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in public places.74  The 
reluctance to find liability for intrusion in public places, however, is not 
absolute.  Where special factors exist, recovery may be warranted, such 
as where a newspaper published a photograph of a woman who was 
exiting the fun house at a county fair and her skirt was blown up by air 
jets under the platform,75 where there was overzealous and unreasonably 
                                                          
 67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 68. See, e.g., Kobeck v. Nabisco, Inc., 305 S.E.2d 183, 185 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that 
the mere disclosure of attendance records by employer to the husband of an employee was not an 
intrusion of privacy). 
 69. DOBBS, supra note 64, at 1201. 
 70. KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, at 856. 
 71. A leading article on intrusion in the context of genetics is Makdisi, supra note 18. 
 72. Even if this aspect of the tort were attributable to the laboratory, it could be asserted that 
both the party acquiring the sample and the party analyzing the sample were joint tortfeasors. 
 73. Makdisi, supra note 18, at 992. 
 74. See, e.g., I.C.U. Investigations, Inc. v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 685, 689–90 (Ala. 2000) (finding 
no liability where investigators on public property videotaped an employee suspected of engaging in 
workers’ compensation fraud). 
 75. E.g., Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964). 
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intrusive surveillance including wiretapping,76 or where there was 
persistent surveillance amounting to harassment.77 
Third, in the relatively few cases decided thus far, the courts have 
not developed a consistent doctrine for when medical testing beyond the 
bounds of consent constitutes intrusion upon seclusion.  For example, a 
Pennsylvania court held that no intrusion upon seclusion occurred when 
a physician conducting a pre-marital blood test performed an HIV test 
without consent and retained the results.78  The court held that because 
there was consent to draw the blood, there was no “invasion of bodily 
integrity.”79  By contrast, a Colorado court held that performing an 
unauthorized HIV test on a student’s blood sample submitted for rubella 
testing, and then reporting the positive HIV test result to the state health 
department, constituted intrusion.80  Significantly for the issue of genetic 
stalking, the court said that extracting the blood and testing the blood 
were separate acts for purposes of intrusion.81 
Fourth, to be actionable, the intrusion must be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.  In the case of genetic stalking, this would seem to be 
the least difficult hurdle for a plaintiff.  The defendants’ acts are 
motivated by their own pecuniary interests and, at a minimum, 
demonstrate an indifference to the harm caused by the disclosures. 
2. Public Disclosure of Private Facts 
Public disclosure of private facts is what led Warren and Brandeis to 
propose the right to privacy, yet it has proven to be the most difficult of 
the four privacy torts to apply.82  Public disclosure of private facts is the 
essence of genetic stalking and surreptitious genetic testing, but it is not 
clear whether the conduct is actionable in tort.  According to the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, public disclosure of private facts consists 
of the following elements: (1) disclosure to the public or a large number 
of persons; (2) of a fact that is private in nature; (3) which would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (4) is not of legitimate 
                                                          
 76. E.g., Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 770–71 (N.Y. 1970). 
 77. E.g., Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1420, 1432–34 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 78. Doe v. Dyer-Goode, 566 A.2d 889, 891 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d 1060, 1067 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998); see also 
Blackwell v. Harris Chem. N. Am., Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1310 (D. Kan. 1998) (holding 
employer’s harassment and badgering of employee’s physician’s office to disclose confidential 
information created a claim for intrusion). 
 81. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d at 1065, 1069. 
 82. See DOBBS, supra note 64, at 1208. 
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concern to the public.83  The disclosure of information about celebrities 
could potentially involve all four elements. 
The first element, widespread publication, is easily satisfied by the 
distribution of the information in any form of mass media, such as by 
print, broadcast, or through the Internet.  Even oral communication may 
be sufficient if there are enough listeners.84  There are several cases 
involving the disclosure of private information to co-workers.  In 
general, courts hold that disclosure of private information to a limited 
number of current or former co-workers is not sufficient disclosure,85 but 
authority exists to the contrary.86  Some of these cases turn on whether 
the employer had a conditional privilege to disclose the information,87 a 
fact that is irrelevant in the context of nonconsensual publication of 
genetic information. 
Second, the fact disclosed must be of a private nature.  Examples in 
the Restatement are sexual relations; family quarrels; unpleasant, 
disgraceful, or humiliating illnesses; and intimate personal letters.88  
Several cases involving the disclosure of an individual’s HIV-positive 
status have held that such information, with its attendant stigma, is 
private in nature.89  Unlike HIV-positive status, however, genetic 
information is not necessarily “unpleasant[,] . . . disgraceful[,] . . . or 
humiliating” as used in the Restatement.  For example, genetic 
information might confirm the paternity of a celebrity father and child; 
indicate that an individual is not genetically predisposed to cancer, 
                                                          
 83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
 84. E.g., Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 902–03 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
 85. E.g., Trought v. Richardson, 338 S.E.2d 617, 619 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); Eddy v. Brown, 
715 P.2d 74, 78 (Okla. 1986); Wells v. Thomas, 569 F. Supp. 426, 437 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Shattuck-
Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 16 P.3d 555, 559 (Utah 2000); see Lemnah v. Am. Breeders Servs., Inc., 
482 A.2d 700, 704–05 (Vt. 1984) (holding that disclosure to customers was insufficient when there 
was not evidence that the disclosure was disseminated to public at large); see also Doe v. Se. Pa. 
Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1143 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that disclosure to management employees 
was a “minimal intrusion” of plaintiff’s constitutional right to privacy). 
 86. See, e.g., Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 378 (Colo. 1997) (determination 
of sufficient disclosure depends on facts and circumstances of each case); Levias v. United Airlines, 
500 N.E.2d 370, 375 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (upholding a verdict against an employer when its 
medical examiner released information to plaintiff’s supervisors even though they did not have “a 
real need to know” the disclosed data). 
 87. See, e.g., Davis v. Monsanto Co., 627 F. Supp. 418, 421–22 (S.D. W. Va. 1986) (finding no 
violation when the disclosure was made to the employer to protect employees from a dangerous co-
worker); Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378, 382–85 (Miss. 1990); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, 
Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 77–79 (W. Va. 1983). 
 88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977). 
 89. See, e.g., Urbaniak v. Newton, 277 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“Under the 
test of tortious invasion of privacy, [HIV positive status] is clearly a ‘private fact . . . .’”); Robert C. 
Ozer, P.C., 940 P.2d at 377 (“[F]acts related to . . . ‘unpleasant or disgraceful’ illnesses are 
considered private in nature.”). 
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Alzheimer’s disease, or some other serious illness; or indicate that a 
celebrity’s ancestral origins coincide with his or her public assertions.  
Despite the fact that the information is, in a sense, “favorable” to the 
individual, it is nevertheless of a private nature, and the purpose of the 
tort is to retain for the individual the autonomy to decide whether to 
undergo genetic testing and, if so, whether to disclose the results.  
Therefore, disclosure of any results of nonconsensual genetic testing 
should be actionable, but would not necessarily be under current 
standards. 
Another aspect of private information is that it must not be within the 
realm of public knowledge.  If the information is a matter of public 
record90 or otherwise widely known,91 then even highly sensitive 
information cannot be considered private.  In the context of celebrities, 
with so much information available about them—some disclosed by 
them or their agents for their own purposes—the range of topics 
considered private might be considerably narrower than for other 
individuals. 
Third, the disclosure must be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.  An often-cited, but frequently criticized, case is Sidis v. F-R 
Publishing Corp.92  A former child mathematics prodigy, who had 
become a recluse, was tracked down and interviewed about his current 
whereabouts and activities.93  The information was published in a 
popular magazine.94  The court held that there was no liability because, 
despite being highly offensive to the plaintiff, publication of the 
information was not considered highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.95  The result may be questioned as inappropriately applying an 
objective standard when the wrongdoer already knew of the individual’s  
 
 
                                                          
 90. See Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 403–04 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that sex offender’s 
identity was a public record under state law); cf. Baker v. Burlington N., Inc., 587 P.2d 829, 833 
(Idaho 1978) (noting that past criminal conduct may become a private matter after the passage of 
time). 
 91. See Trout v. Umatilla County Sch. Dist., 712 P.2d 814, 817–18 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) 
(observing that a crash involving drunk school teachers was widely known before the school district 
published disciplinary measures). 
 92. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). 
 93. Id. at 807. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. at 809 (noting that when intrusions are “focused upon public characters, truthful 
comments upon dress, speech, habits, and the ordinary aspects of personality will usually not 
transgress [the] line” of decency). 
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heightened sensitivity.96  An alternative basis for finding liability in the 
case is simply that the information was wrongfully obtained by deceit.97 
Fourth, the matter must not be a legitimate concern of the public.  
There is a clash between the interests of privacy and First Amendment 
protections for freedom of expression.  In Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing 
Co., the plaintiff, a private citizen, became famous when he acted to 
prevent the shooting of then-President Ford.98  Two days later, a 
newspaper columnist revealed that the plaintiff was gay, resulting in 
substantial emotional distress.99  The plaintiff’s subsequent action for 
invasion of privacy was unsuccessful, in part, because his sexual 
orientation was considered “newsworthy.”100  The court’s analysis and its 
implications are troubling.  Because there was no connection between the 
reason for the plaintiff’s newsworthiness and his sexual orientation, 
Sipple suggests that any information about someone in the public eye, no 
matter how fleeting, might be considered “newsworthy.” 
Another case involving newsworthiness is Gilbert v. Medical 
Economics Co.101  The defendant magazine published an extremely 
critical article about an anesthesiologist, which included her picture and 
name, as well as personal facts about her psychiatric history and marital 
life.102  In an action for invasion of privacy, the court held that the 
plaintiff’s personal information was newsworthy because of the close 
nexus between the plaintiff’s personal problems and the underlying 
malpractice issues in the story, which were matters of public concern.103 
Because of the difficulty in drawing lines between newsworthy 
information and disclosures that invade the privacy of the individual, 
some states have rejected any actions for public disclosure of private 
facts.104 
                                                          
 96. By contrast, in cases involving intentional infliction of emotional distress, the courts use an 
objective standard, unless the defendant knew of the plaintiff’s heightened sensitivity or 
vulnerability.  KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, at 62–63. 
 97. See DOBBS, supra note 64, at 1204–05 (“[I]f the interviewer had gained entry into Sidis’ 
room and mind by deceit and breach of confidence, liability of the interviewer would have been 
entirely appropriate.”). 
 98. Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 669–70. 
 101. 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981). 
 102. Id. at 306. 
 103. Id. at 308–09. 
 104. DOBBS, supra note 64, at 1208.  For a further discussion of statutory regulation of 
publishing information and First Amendment concerns, see infra notes 217–23 and accompanying 
text. 
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3. False Light 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines false light invasion of 
privacy as follows: 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the 
other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other 
for the invasion of his privacy, if 
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, and 
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the 
falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other 
would be placed.105 
The injury in a false light claim is the mental distress resulting from an 
invasion of the individual’s privacy; by contrast, in defamation the harm 
is to the individual’s reputation.106  Thus, theoretically, it is easier for a 
plaintiff to prove false light than defamation because the plaintiff in a 
false light case need only prove that the communication was false and 
offensive, rather than defamatory.107  As with defamation, however, the 
defenses of truthfulness of the statement, consent, the expression of 
opinion by the defendant, and privileged communication will preclude 
liability.108 
The Supreme Court added a constitutional dimension to the tort of 
false light invasion of privacy with its decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill.109  
The Court held that in false light cases, as in defamation cases,110 if the 
plaintiff is a public official or public figure, the false light statement is 
only actionable if it was published with knowledge of falsity or a  
 
 
                                                          
 105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).  The history of the tort is often traced to 
1816, “when Lord Byron succeeded in enjoining the circulation of a bad poem which had been 
attributed to his pen.”  KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, at 863 (citing Lord Byron v. Johnston, 35 Eng. 
Rep. 851 (1816)).  Improper attribution is still the basis of some false light claims.  See, e.g., Jonap 
v. Silver, 474 A.2d 800, 802 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (letter critical of FDA falsely attributed to the 
plaintiff was published in a trade magazine). 
 106. KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, at 864. 
 107. DOBBS, supra note 64, at 1208–09. 
 108. KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, at 867–68. 
 109. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
 110. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
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reckless disregard for the truth.111  The actions of an agent, such as a 
reporter, may be attributable to a principal, including a newspaper.112 
False light invasion of privacy might be implicated in genetic 
stalking cases, but the facts would have to be exceptional, especially 
because the plaintiff, as a celebrity, would be a public figure.  Liability is 
possible if the defendant published the results of a genetic test and falsely 
attributed the results to the plaintiff when the defendant knew they were 
not the plaintiff’s test results or published the results with a reckless 
disregard for the truth.113  Other possible bases of liability are publishing 
test results generated by a laboratory known to produce erroneous 
findings and reporting associations between genetic test results and 
health conditions known not to be based on scientific evidence. Because 
of the nature of the defendant’s conduct required to establish false light 
invasion of privacy, if this cause of action were used in the context of 
genetic stalking, it would likely be part of a series of tort claims rather 
than a single basis of liability. 
4. Appropriation of Name or Likeness 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides a cause of action for 
invasion of privacy based on appropriation of an individual’s name or 
likeness.  “One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or 
likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy.”114  Typical cases have involved the use of an individual’s 
photograph in advertising without permission.115  One who sells another 
individual’s DNA profile without permission would clearly seem to be 
benefiting from “the reputation, prestige, social or commercial standing, 
public interest or other values of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”116  The 
                                                          
 111. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 390. 
 112. Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 254 (1974). 
 113. This could arise where the publisher failed to make a reasonable effort to verify that the 
biological specimen was that of the celebrity or the testing was performed in a scientific manner.  In 
Bilodeau-Allen v. American Media, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 2d 129, 129–30 (D. Mass. 2008), a mother 
and son brought a false light invasion of privacy claim against a tabloid for allegedly running a false 
story that the son was the illegitimate child of a United States senator.  Although the action was 
dismissed because Massachusetts law does not recognize the tort of false light invasion of privacy, 
id. at 130–31, the facts could be replicated where paternity or non-paternity findings based on 
genetic test results are published with knowledge of their falsity or a reckless disregard for their 
truthfulness. 
 114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). 
 115. See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Century Supply Co., 693 N.E.2d 510 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Johnson v. 
Boeing Airplane Co., 262 P.2d 808 (Kan. 1953); Shepard’s Pharmacy, Inc. v. Stop & Shop Cos., 640 
N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994); Staruski v. Cont’l Tel. Co., 581 A.2d 266 (Vt. 1990). 
 116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. c (1977). 
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only issue is whether the results of a DNA test would constitute an 
individual’s “name or likeness.”  Not surprisingly, there are no cases 
directly on point.117 
In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, John Moore, a 
resident of Seattle, was treated for hairy-cell leukemia by Dr. David W. 
Golde at the University of California-Los Angeles (UCLA) Medical 
Center.118  Following a surgical splenectomy as part of his treatment, 
portions of Moore’s excised spleen were used by Dr. Golde and his 
research colleagues to develop a cell line from Moore’s T-
lymphocytes.119  UCLA applied for, and was granted, a patent on the cell 
line, which listed Dr. Golde and a colleague as inventors.120  Although 
the invention was expected to have substantial commercial value, no 
royalties or profits were ever generated and the defendants only received 
an initial payment from the commercial interests.121  Nevertheless, 
neither Dr. Golde nor anyone else at UCLA informed Moore before 
surgery, after surgery, or during three follow-up visits—suggested by Dr. 
Golde, during which additional blood and other biological specimens 
were obtained—that UCLA intended to use Moore’s biological material 
for research or commercial purposes.122 
When Moore learned of the use of his cell lines without his 
permission, he sued the defendants under various causes of action.123  In 
rejecting Moore’s claim for appropriation of name or likeness, the 
California Supreme Court held that the appropriated material must be 
“unique” to the plaintiff, and the court stated that the lymphokines used 
by the defendants are of the same basic molecular structure in all human 
beings.124  Such an argument is hard to square with either the science or 
the facts, because it was precisely the uniqueness of the cell line derived 
from John Moore that purportedly made it so valuable.  Similarly, even 
                                                          
 117. See generally Azza Jayaprakash, Sum of Your Parts: Are There Adequate Remedies for 
Victims of Fraudulent Tissue and Organ Acquisition?, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1235 (2006) 
(discussing remedies available for improper organ acquisition under tort law, property law, and 
business ethics). 
 118. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481 (Cal. 1990). 
 119. Id. at 481.  T-lymphocytes are cells produced in the thymus gland and stored in secondary 
lymphoid glands—such as the spleen—,bone marrow, and lymph nodes.  THE MERCK MANUALS 
ONLINE MEDICAL LIBRARY, http://www.merck.com/mmhe/sec16/ch183/ch183c.html (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2008).  “They circulate in the bloodstream and lymphatic system,” where they search and 
destroy foreign or abnormal cells, such as bacteria and viruses.  Id. 
 120. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481–82. 
 121. Id. at 482. 
 122. Id. at 481. 
 123. Id. at 482.  For a discussion of his claim based on conversion, see infra notes 132–36 and 
accompanying text. 
 124. Moore, 793 P.2d at 490. 
08.0_ROTHSTEIN FINAL 2/14/2009  3:13:16 PM 
2009] GENETIC STALKING AND VOYEURISM 557 
though the DNA of any human is comprised of the same four 
nucleotides, the order of the nucleotide base pairs is unique in every 
human, and DNA analyses indicate, or at least suggest, certain biological 
characteristics of the individual whose DNA is analyzed.125 
Some states have codified the common law tort of appropriation of 
name or likeness to prohibit the use of a person’s photograph or name for 
commercial purposes without express consent,126 although the statutory 
approach does not necessarily translate into greater privacy protection 
than the common law.  In Mendonsa v. Time Inc., a statutory claim was 
brought under New York law by the sailor in the famous Life magazine 
photo depicting him kissing a nurse in Times Square on V-J Day in 
1945.127  In 1987, Life offered to sell copies of the photograph for $1600 
each without offering any compensation to the sailor, whose identity was 
known.128  The court held that, although the initial publication in 1945 
was newsworthy and not for commercial purposes, the subsequent 
publication was for commercial purposes in violation of the statute.129  It 
is not clear whether statutorily-based claims for appropriation of DNA 
information would be greeted with greater judicial solicitude than 
common law claims.  Nevertheless, the existence of state statutes 
suggests a legislative intent to protect celebrities and others from 
commercial exploitation of their public persona. 
B. Conversion 
Traditionally, individuals have not been concerned about what 
happens to traces of their saliva or other biological material left behind 
on a subsequently seized object.  They have been concerned about the 
information that can be discovered through genetic or other scientific 
analysis of the biological material.  Conversion is a property tort and, to 
be actionable, the plaintiff must have an ownership interest in the 
property converted.130  With abandoned waste material, it may be 
difficult to assert a property interest in the object taken, such as a 
discarded cigarette butt or soft drink can.  Alternatively, even if an 
individual does not have a property interest in the abandoned object 
                                                          
 125. THE MERCK MANUALS ONLINE MEDICAL LIBRARY, http://www.merck.com/mmhe/sec01/ 
ch002/ch002b.html?qt=DNA&alt=sh#N10FB9 (last visited Nov. 9, 2008). 
 126. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997); N.Y. CIV. RTS. LAW § 51 (McKinney 1992); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839.1 (West 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (West 1950). 
 127. Mendonsa v. Time Inc., 678 F. Supp. 967, 968 (D.R.I. 1988). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 972. 
 130. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489 (Cal. 1990). 
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containing the biological material, an individual might assert a property 
interest in the information contained in the specimen.  If so, then another 
party’s intentional exercise of dominion over the specimen containing 
the information would constitute the tort of conversion.131  In the few 
cases that address the issue, the courts were not receptive to either 
theory. 
The leading case on conversion of human biological material is 
Moore, discussed in the previous section.  Another of Moore’s claims 
was based on conversion.132  In analyzing this cause of action, the 
California Supreme Court considered whether Moore retained an 
ownership interest in his cells after his possession of the cells ended.133  
The court observed that no reported judicial decision supported Moore’s 
claim, and furthermore, that a California statute seemed to limit a 
patient’s continuing interest in excised cells.134  The court also 
emphasized that the patent was not issued on the excised tissue, per se, 
but on the cell line developed from the tissue, and that public policy 
supported the development of materials for biomedical research.135  As 
the court stated: “[t]he extension of conversion law into this area will 
hinder research by restricting access to the necessary raw materials.”136 
A similar issue was raised in Greenberg v. Miami Children’s 
Hospital Research Institute, Inc.137  Plaintiffs, who were parents of 
children with Canavan disease,138 gave money and tissue samples to a 
researcher to discover the genetic basis of the disorder.139  The researcher 
                                                          
 131. “Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so 
seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay 
the other the full value of the chattel.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1977). 
 132. Moore, 793 P.2d at 482. 
 133. Id. at 488–89. 
 134. Id. at 489.  The court referred to a California statute providing for prompt disposal of 
human tissue, which admittedly was meant to address hazardous waste concerns and not 
compensation for scientific use of the tissue.  Id. at 491.  The effect of the court’s holding is to create 
a “no compensation” default rule.  Russell Korobkin, “No Compensation” or “Pro Compensation”: 
Moore v. Regents and Default Rules for Human Tissue Donations, 40 J. HEALTH L. 1, 9–10 (2007). 
 135. Moore, 793 P.2d at 493–94. 
 136. Id. at 494. 
 137. 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 138. Canavan disease is a neurological genetic disorder “in which the white matter of the brain 
degenerates into spongy tissue riddled with microscopic, fluid-filled spaces.”  NATIONAL INSTITUTE 
OF NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS AND STROKE, NINDS Canavan Disease Information Page, 
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/canavan/canavan.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2008).  Symptoms, 
“which appear in early infancy and progress rapidly, may include mental retardation, loss of 
previously acquired motor skills, feeding difficulties,” paralysis, blindness, and hearing loss.  Id.  
Death usually occurs by age four.  Id. 
 139. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1066. 
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successfully isolated the gene responsible for Canavan disease.140  
Without informing the plaintiffs, the researcher’s institution patented the 
gene and licensed it to a genetic test developer.141  The plaintiffs sued on 
various legal theories, including conversion.142  The court held that the 
plaintiffs failed to state a claim for conversion.143  It cited Moore with 
approval and noted that under Florida law “the property right in blood 
and tissue samples . . . evaporates once the sample is voluntarily given to 
a third party.”144 
In considering how these cases might affect an action for conversion 
based on genetic stalking, there are three distinguishing characteristics.  
First, in both Moore and Greenberg, the samples were voluntarily given 
to the researchers, albeit not with the intent to authorize the subsequent 
uses.145  Genetic stalking cases could involve either abandoned property 
(e.g., discarded chewing gum) or stolen property (e.g., a napkin taken 
from a restaurant).  It is not clear if the method of acquisition of the 
specimen would influence the outcome of an action for conversion 
because the basis of the action is not conversion of the object containing 
the DNA, but obtaining and using the information revealed by the DNA.  
Second, Moore and Greenberg explicitly relied on the public policy in 
favor of medical research.146  No such public interest is ordinarily 
implicated in analyzing biologically “unexceptional” DNA.  There might 
be a public interest in learning the genetic predisposition to illness of a 
candidate for high public office, but in typical cases courts relying on 
public policy would likely find that it favors protecting genetic 
information from unwanted disclosure.  Third, in Moore and Greenberg, 
the specimens had value because they formed the basis of a cell line or 
indicated the presence of a genetic marker.147  A court might decide that 
the traces of saliva or other body fluids acquired solely for analysis have 
no value in themselves, but only as the source of information.  Thus, they 
might conclude that nothing of value was converted.148  Based on 
                                                          
 140. Id. at 1067. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1068. 
 143. Id. at 1076. 
 144. Id. at 1074–75; see also Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 675 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. 
denied, 128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008) (holding that patients who authorized their surgeon and his 
colleagues to use excised tissue for research did not retain any property interest in their tissue, and 
therefore, they could not authorize their surgeon to take the tissue with him to his new university). 
 145. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1066–67; Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 
479, 481 (Cal. 1990). 
 146. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1076; Moore, 793 P.2d at 493–97. 
 147. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1067; Moore, 793 P.2d at 482. 
 148. The owner of an object taken for analysis (e.g., linen napkin) would have an action for 
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existing case law, conversion is unlikely to afford a viable cause of 
action for the unauthorized taking of an object for genetic testing and 
publication of the results. 
IV. STATE GENETIC PRIVACY LAWS 
Beginning in the 1990s, several states enacted some form of genetic 
privacy law,149 often as part of a legislative package including 
prohibitions on genetic discrimination in health insurance, employment, 
or both.  Among other things, these laws require consent (often written, 
informed consent) before genetic testing is performed, before access is 
granted to genetic information, and before genetic information is retained 
or disclosed.150  The laws usually provide for specific penalties for 
violations.151  As of 2009, there were twelve states with laws requiring 
consent before performing genetic testing.152  The laws all contain 
several exceptions which vary by state but generally include genetic 
testing for law enforcement, newborn screening, paternity 
determinations, and other publicly acceptable purposes. 
In reviewing these laws, it is doubtful that any of them would apply 
to genetic stalking and surreptitious genetic testing.  To begin with, the 
laws in three states only apply to health care providers or physicians.153  
In another, the law only applies to insurance companies.154  Of the states 
with laws of general applicability, one applies only to “predictive” 
genetic testing, which would characterize a test indicating an individual’s 
risk of illness, but would not apply to a genetic analysis of parentage, 
ethnic origins, or other tests likely to be performed in the context of 
genetic stalking.155  Four states prohibit the genetic testing of a biological 
sample “taken from an individual,”156 a “sample,”157 or “bodily 
                                                                                                                       
conversion, but the value of the object is unlikely to justify the cost of litigation.  The owner of the 
object, unless it is also the person whose DNA is analyzed, would not have standing to assert the 
claims based on genetic testing and publication of the results. 
 149. For a compilation of these laws, see National Conference of State Legislatures, State 
Genetic Privacy Laws, updated June 2008, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/prt.htm 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2008). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.  The states are Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, 
New Mexico, New York, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Vermont. 
 153. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70G(C) (West 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 
333.17020, 333.17520 (West 2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-551 (Supp. 2007). 
 154. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-3(b) (West 2003). 
 155. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-14-21 to -22 (2004). 
 156. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS § 79-1(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-93-40 
(2002). 
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materials” of an individual,158 all of which might not apply to genetic 
testing of an abandoned item.  As to the remaining three states159 with the 
most general or vague prohibitions on nonconsensual genetic testing, 
there is no indication that the laws were intended to address the issue of 
genetic stalking or surreptitious genetic testing. 
V. POLICY OPTIONS 
New DNA technology creates great challenges for protecting 
privacy.  Every human sheds DNA constantly in hair and skin cells; we 
also leave traces of DNA (e.g., in saliva and perspiration) on objects used 
in daily life.  Does the ubiquity of DNA and the ease of obtaining, 
analyzing, and publishing the results of genetic testing make it futile to 
attempt to control genetic stalking and voyeurism?  Or, are the privacy 
interests so fundamental and the potential harms so substantial to all 
individuals—not just celebrities—that a comprehensive regime of legal 
regulation should be developed and implemented immediately to prohibit 
nonconsensual genetic testing?160 
The range of possible answers to these questions is illustrated by 
quotes from two highly diverse sources.  On one side, Justice Brandeis, 
in his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States, rejected the Supreme 
Court majority’s view that the Fourth Amendment did not extend to 
wiretapping because electronic communications were unknown when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted.161  He wrote: “Time works changes, 
brings into existence new conditions and purposes.  Therefore a principle 
to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which 
gave it birth.”162  According to Brandeis, privacy is such a fundamental 
element of civilized society that legal doctrines should be adapted to 
respond to new technological developments.163  The opposite view is 
                                                                                                                       
 157. ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a)(1) (2007). 
 158. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9332(d) (2007). 
 159. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448.02 (2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40 (West Supp. 2009); 
N.M. STAT. § 24-21-3 (2003). 
 160. A debate on the same issue, whether it was possible to protect privacy in the face of new 
developments in the media, took place at the beginning of the twentieth century with the advent of 
cheaper printing and photographic technology.  DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: 
GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 110 (2007). 
 161. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471–85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 
(1967).  The Supreme Court eventually adopted Brandeis’s view in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967). 
 162. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472–73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Weems v. United States, 
217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)). 
 163. Id. at 472 (“[I]ndividual protections against specific abuses of power, must have a . . . 
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captured succinctly by the often-quoted statement of Scott McNealy, 
Chief Executive Officer of Sun Microsystems, who responded to 
consumer privacy concerns about new technology by stating: “You have 
zero privacy anyway. Get over it.”164 
A. Additional Sources of Public Policy 
Sections II–IV discussed the applicability and adequacy of 
constitutional law, tort law, and state genetic privacy laws in preventing 
genetic stalking and remedying its harms.  In formulating public policy, 
it is also valuable to consider instructive legislative responses to 
emerging privacy concerns. 
Genome sequencing, digital communications, the Internet, and other 
technologies complicate the task of protecting genetic privacy.  
Nevertheless, the following three laws enacted since 2003 strongly 
suggest that measures to prohibit genetic stalking and voyeurism could 
receive popular and political support.  Collectively, these laws show the 
inclination of legislatures to respond to new privacy threats, even if the 
response is slow in coming and incomplete in coverage. 
1. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) 
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA)165 
was enacted after a difficult, thirteen-year battle in Congress.166  GINA 
prohibits discrimination in health insurance and employment on the basis 
of genetic information, defined as information about an individual’s 
genetic tests, the genetic tests of family members, or the occurrence of a 
disease in family members of the individual.167  GINA prohibits health 
insurers and employers from requiring genetic testing or using an 
individual’s genetically-enhanced risk of illness to discriminate in health 
insurance coverage or cost, or in any terms and conditions of 
employment.168 
                                                                                                                       
capacity of adaption to a changing world.”). 
 164. Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: ‘Get Over It,’ WIRED, Jan. 26, 1999, http:// 
www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538.  Mr. McNealy recently repeated this statement 
and reaffirmed his support for the underlying principle at a conference where he and the author 
spoke, the World Congress on Health Information Technology, Washington, D.C., Dec. 10, 2008. 
 165. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 
[hereinafter GINA] (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. titles 26, 29, and 42). 
 166. See Louise M. Slaughter, Your Genes and Privacy, 316 SCIENCE 797, 797 (2007) 
(discussing legislative history of federal genetic nondiscrimination legislation). 
 167. GINA §§ 101(a), 102, 201(4), 202. 
 168. Id. §§ 101, 102, 202. 
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Despite the lack of many documented incidents of genetic 
discrimination,169 GINA was enacted because numerous individuals at 
risk of genetic disorders declined testing out of fear of the 
consequences.170  Thus, by prohibiting certain uses of genetic 
information generated by the tests, in theory, at-risk individuals would be 
more willing to undergo potentially beneficial genetic testing.171  The 
congressional findings section of GINA states that federal legislation “is 
necessary to fully protect the public from discrimination and allay their 
concerns about the potential for discrimination, thereby allowing 
individuals to take advantage of genetic testing, new technologies, and 
new therapies.”172 
It is unlikely that GINA will have its desired effects.  The law is 
notoriously limited in scope.173  It does not apply to life insurance, 
disability insurance, or long-term care insurance.174  Significantly, GINA 
only applies to individuals who are asymptomatic.175  Thus, it would not 
prevent a health insurance company from declining to renew or 
substantially increasing the rates for an individual health insurance 
policy after an individual becomes ill, even if the individual is affected 
by the condition for which he or she was at a genetically increased 
risk.176  GINA explicitly provides that the statute does not apply if there 
has been a “manifestation” of a disease or disorder,177 but the term is not 
defined.  It is not clear what effect increasingly sophisticated biomarkers  
 
                                                          
 169. E.g., Mark A. Hall & Stephen S. Rich, Genetic Privacy Laws and Patients’ Fear of 
Discrimination by Health Insurers: The View from Genetic Counselors, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 245, 
245 (2000). 
 170. See Slaughter, supra note 166. 
 171. GINA § 2. 
 172. Id. § 2(5). 
 173. See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein, Putting the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act in 
Context, 10 GENETICS IN MED. 655, 655–56 (2008); Mark A. Rothstein, Is GINA Worth the Wait?, 
36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 174, 174 (2008). 
 174. Rothstein, Putting the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act in Context, supra note 
173, at 655. 
 175. GINA §§ 101(a)(3)(B) (group health insurance), 102(b)(1)(B) (individual health insurance), 
210 (employment). 
 176. GINA § 102(b)(1)(B).  To prevent such adverse treatment, the concept of medical 
underwriting would need to be removed from individual health insurance policies.  This would not 
occur in the absence of a major overhaul of the health finance system of the United States.  For this 
reason, so-called genetic discrimination in health insurance is less about genetics than it is about the 
issue of who has access to health care and under what mechanism.  See Russell Korobkin & Rahul 
Rajkumar, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act—A Half-Step Toward Risk Sharing, 359 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 335–37 (2008); Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Exceptionalism and Legislative 
Pragmatism, 35 HASTINGS CTR. REP. no. 4, at 27 (2005). 
 177. GINA § 102(b). 
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that measure presymptomatic biological changes will have on statutory 
coverage.178 
GINA is not totally without value.179  It prohibits discrimination 
against individuals at increased risk of a genetic-related condition, and 
many such individuals will never develop the condition despite their 
increased risk.  GINA also is important for policy reasons.  It is the first 
federal law expressly intended to prevent discrimination based on 
genotype.180  It is also the first federal law exclusively intended to 
ameliorate the negative consequences of new genetic technologies. 
2. Video Voyeurism Prevention Act 
The federal Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2003 amended the 
federal criminal code to prohibit a person within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States from intentionally capturing an image of 
a private area of an individual’s unclothed or “undergarment clad” body 
without the individual’s consent under circumstances in which the 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.181  An individual 
convicted of such an offense is subject to a fine of up to $100,000, up to 
one year imprisonment, or both.182 
According to the House Report on the law, “video voyeurism” was 
becoming a growing privacy concern because of the “development of 
small, concealed cameras and cell phone cameras, along with the 
instantaneous distribution capabilities of the Internet.”183  Many states 
lacked legislation making such conduct unlawful.184  The federal law was 
designed to protect a reasonable expectation of privacy on federal land, 
                                                          
 178. Mark A. Rothstein, GINA, the ADA, and Genetic Discrimination in Employment, 36 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 425, 427 (2008). 
 179. For a more positive view of GINA, see Kathy L. Hudson, M.K. Holohan & Francis S. 
Collins, Keeping Pace with the Times—The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 358 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2661 (2008). 
 180. Numerous state laws also prohibit genetic discrimination in health insurance and 
employment.  At least forty-four jurisdictions prohibit genetic discrimination in individual health 
insurance.  See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Genetic Information: Legal 
Issues Relating to Discrimination and Privacy, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ 
ndishlth.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).  At least thirty-five jurisdictions prohibit genetic 
discrimination in employment.  See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, State 
Genetic Employment Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndiscrim.htm (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2008).  Employer-sponsored group health plans are regulated by federal law, and a provision 
of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act prohibits genetic discrimination by such 
plans.  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a)(1)(F) (2000). 
 181. Pub. L. 108-495, 118 Stat. 4001 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006)). 
 182. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1801(a), 3571(b)(5) (2006). 
 183. H.R. REP. NO. 108-504, at 2 (2004), as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3292, 3293. 
 184. See id. at 2–3. 
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such as national parks and federal buildings,185 as well as serving as 
model legislation for states that had not yet enacted their own laws.186 
The video voyeurism law has no direct relevance to genetic stalking, 
but it is instructive.  Congress demonstrated its willingness to enact 
legislation to protect the reasonable expectation of privacy of individuals 
from surreptitious, intrusive conduct facilitated by modern technology, 
including the use of the Internet to broadcast private images.  On the 
other hand, Congress was unwilling to enact a federal law of general 
applicability beyond federal property. 
3. Human Tissue Act (United Kingdom) 
The United Kingdom’s Human Tissue Act of 2004 is a long, 
detailed, and comprehensive statute regulating human organ 
transplantation and the collection, analysis, storage, and use of human 
tissue.187  The law was enacted in response to reports of abuses at certain 
hospitals where the organs and tissue of children who had died were 
removed, stored, and used without proper consent.188  The law 
supersedes earlier transplantation laws and created a system of regulation 
directed by the newly established Human Tissue Authority.189  The law 
provides for substantial criminal sanctions for violations.  A person 
found guilty of violating the Act is subject to a fine, imprisonment for up 
to three years, or both.190 
Although the primary purpose of the law is to deal with the use of 
human tissue for transplantation and research, the law prohibits any 
nonconsensual analysis of DNA.  Section 45 makes it unlawful for any 






                                                          
 185. Id. at 3. 
 186. Id.  Forty-seven states have enacted laws prohibiting video voyeurism, but they vary in 
definitions and punishment.  See THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, Video Voyeurism 
Laws, http://www.ncvc.org/src/AGP.Net/Components/DocumentViewer/Download.aspxnz?Docu 
mentID=40459 (last visited Nov. 6, 2008). 
 187. Human Tissue Act 2004, c. 30 (Eng.). 
 188. Human Tissue Act 2004, Explanatory Note, ¶ 5. 
 189. See Human Tissue Act 2004, §§ 13–15. 
 190. Id. § 45(3). 
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the intent to have DNA testing performed.191  There are exceptions for 
medical treatment, law enforcement, research, and other uses.192 
The inclusion of Section 45 is a direct result of concerns about 
genetic stalking.  In 2002, there were press reports about an alleged plot 
to steal hair from Prince Harry and perform surreptitious genetic 
testing.193  The purpose of the plot was to determine if Major James 
Hewitt, with whom Princess Diana was said to have had an affair, was 
the father of Prince Harry rather than Prince Charles.194  Section 45 was 
intended to make such conduct a crime.195 
Baroness Helena Kennedy, a member of the House of Lords and 
Chair of the Human Genetics Commission, clearly recognized that the 
new law bans surreptitious, nonconsensual genetic testing.  She 
described the purpose of Section 45 in more general terms: 
Until now there has been nothing to stop an unscrupulous person, 
perhaps a journalist or private investigator, from secretly taking an 
everyday object used by a public figure—like a coffee mug or a 
toothbrush—with the express purpose of having the person’s DNA 
analysed.  Similarly, an employer could have secretly taken DNA 
samples to use for their purposes.196 
The law took full effect on September 1, 2006, but as of June 2008,  
there had not been any prosecutions under section 45.197 
                                                          
 191. Section 45 of the Act, entitled “Non-consensual analysis of DNA,” provides in pertinent 
part: 
A person commits an offence if — 
(a) he has any bodily material intending — 
(i) that any human DNA in the material to be analysed without qualifying consent, and 
(ii) that the results of the analysis be used otherwise than for an excepted purpose . . . . 
Id. § 45(1). 
 192. Human Tissue Act 2004, Explanatory Note, ¶ 58. 
 193. Prince Harry “Honey Trap” Allegations, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, Dec. 15, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2577539.stm. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Colin Brown, Secret Testing on “Stolen” DNA to Be Outlawed, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, June 
15, 2003, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1433037/Secret-testing-on-stolen-
DNA-to-be-outlawed.html. 
 196. Chris Williams, Internet DNA Test Kits Could Land You Three Years, THE REGISTER, Sept. 
1, 2006, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/09/01/dna_sampling_ban/print.html. 
 197. E-mail from Stuart Giblin, Communications Officer of the Human Tissue Authority, to 
Natasha Loder, Science & Technology Correspondent, THE ECONOMIST (June 16, 2008) (on file 
with author).  A single prosecution has been brought under Section 32 against a man who was 
advertising to sell one of his kidneys.  Id. 
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B. Developing New Policies 
Any comprehensive approach to regulate genetic stalking should 
consider the four parties involved in the process: (1) the individual 
stalkers who collect the DNA, (2) the laboratories analyzing the DNA, 
(3) the publishers of the genetic test results, and (4) the websites 
encouraging and facilitating the stalking. 
1. The Collectors 
Individuals engaged in genetic stalking could violate several statutes 
and common law provisions.  If they were actually “stalking” the 
celebrities,198 this would be actionable in tort199 as well as criminal 
law.200  They might also be committing a separate violation in the 
process, such as civil or criminal trespass by entering property without 
permission or the crime of larceny or the tort of conversion if they stole 
something of value to obtain the DNA sample. 
It would be of questionable utility to prosecute individuals who 
obtained abandoned property, even if they obtained the property with the 
intent to sell it or have its DNA content analyzed.  Overly broad 
legislation could prohibit young fans from saving the used chewing 
gum201 or soft drink cans of rock stars or athletes.  There is no reason to 
prohibit such collection, even with the intent to sell this “memorabilia,” 
any more than banning the sale of photographs of celebrities taken in 
public places. 
If a criminal statute were enacted prohibiting the sale of an object 
with the intent to analyze the DNA on the object without consent, it 
                                                          
 198. In general, stalking is a course of conduct “in which one individual inflicts on another 
repeated unwanted intrusions and communications,” to such an extent that the victim fears for his or 
her safety.  Michele Pathé & Paul E. Mullen, The Impact of Stalkers on Their Victims, 170 BRIT. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 12, 12 (1997).  Various criminal laws prohibiting stalking include their own 
definitions.  Related crimes include menacing and harassment.  For a complete list of state and 
federal stalking laws, see NATIONAL CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, STALKING RESOURCE 
CENTER, http://www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_Register204 (last visited June 18, 2008). 
 199. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 998–99 (2d Cir. 1973) (affirming and modifying 
an injunction prohibiting a freelance photographer from, among other things, coming within twenty-
five feet of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis or her children or engaging in any conduct that would be 
reasonably foreseeable to cause harassment, alarm, or fright); Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 
N.E.2d 765, 770–71 (N.Y. 1970) (wiretapping, but not surveillance or questioning the friends of a 
consumer advocate, constituted an invasion of privacy under District of Columbia law). 
 200. See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, The Pursuer of Thurman is Convicted, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 
2008, at B1. 
 201. See, e.g., Jessica Simpson’s Gum Selling on Ebay, http://www.simplydumb.com/?p=278& 
akst_action=share-this (last visited Nov. 10, 2008). 
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might be very difficult to prove intent, unless the sale is to a commercial 
website such as Celebrity Genetics.  The U.K.’s Human Tissue Act of 
2004 prohibits the sale of “bodily material” with the intent to analyze 
DNA.202  Although such a prohibition would be valuable in the United 
States, other measures are also needed to outlaw genetic stalking. 
2. The Laboratories 
A variety of public and private bodies regulate genetic testing 
laboratories.  Laboratories performing genetic testing for clinical 
purposes are regulated by the College of American Pathologists203 and 
the Department of Health and Human Services,204 pursuant to the 
Clinical Laboratories Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA).205  
Although about half the states have some degree of statutory authority 
for oversight of clinical laboratories, only California, New York, and 
Washington require any review of clinical validity for individual 
assays.206  Laboratories performing genetic testing for forensic purposes 
are regulated, albeit voluntarily, by the American Society of Crime 
Laboratory Directors and the National Forensics Science Technology 
Center.207  Laboratories performing genetic testing for paternity are 
accredited by the American Association of Blood Banks.208  Home-
collection test kits for clinical use are regulated by the Food and Drug 
Administration.209 
Despite the involvement of numerous professional and regulatory 
bodies, laboratories performing genetic testing for nonclinical, 
                                                          
 202. See supra notes 187–92 and accompanying text. 
 203. COLLEGE OF AMERICAN PATHOLOGISTS, CAP Facts, http://www.cap.org (last visited Nov. 
10, 2008). 
 204. 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2000). 
 205. Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102 Stat. 2903. 
 206. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS, 
HEALTH & SOCIETY, U.S. SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTING: A RESPONSE TO THE 
CHARGE OF THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 100 (2008) [hereinafter DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. REPORT]. 
 207. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CRIME LABORATORY DIRECTORS/LABORATORY ACCREDITATION 
BOARD, http://www.ascld-lab.org/dual/aslabdualobjectives.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009); NFSTC, 
http://www.nfstc.org/aboutus/index.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
 208. American Association of Blood Banks, Relationship Testing Accreditation Program, 
http://www.aabb.org/Content/Accreditation/Parentage_Testing_Accreditation_Program/ (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2008).  Because earlier parentage testing used serology rather than genetic analysis, the 
accreditation responsibility initially was given to the American Association of Blood Banks, where it 
has remained.  A New Generation of Genomics: The Impact of Molecular Testing Methods on Blood 
Bank Operations and Clinical Care, AABB NEWS, http://www.aabb.org/Content/News_and_Media/ 
Latest_News/news0811a.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2009). 
 209. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. REPORT, supra note 206, at 96. 
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nonforensic, and legally inadmissible purposes currently are not subject 
to any regulation.  New Internet-based companies performing genome-
wide association studies or more limited genetic risk assessments do not 
submit any claims to public or private payers for reimbursement and 
assert that they are providing their services for informational rather than 
diagnostic purposes.210  These laboratories also are not covered by the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy 
Rule because they do not submit claims for payment in electronic 
format.211  Therefore, there are no federal statutory or regulatory limits 
on the uses and disclosures by the laboratories of genetic information 
they acquire from genetic tests.  Laboratories performing “curiosity” 
testing to assess paternity also do not require regulatory approval, 
although the results from an unaccredited laboratory generally are not 
admissible in court.212 
There are no reliable figures about the number of laboratories 
offering various types of unregulated genetic testing services, but there 
are at least one hundred Internet-based genetic testing companies, and 
the number is growing.213  Focusing new statutes and regulations on the 
laboratories would be effective, at least for the laboratories located in the 
United States.  Thus, if laboratories were prohibited from performing 
genetic testing without the express consent of the subject, then genetic 
stalking and obtaining items containing DNA would be pointless.  Even 








                                                          
 210. Andrew Pollack, Gene Testing Questioned by Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2008, at 
C1.  Responding to consumer complaints, California and New York have sent letters to 23andMe, 
deCODE genetics, Navigenics, and other Internet-based companies to inform them that performing 
genetic testing without a physician’s approval violates state law.  David Ewing Duncan, Block That 
Test!, CONDÉ NAST PORTFOLIO.COM, Apr. 21, 2008, http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/top-
5/2008/04/21/Legal-Challenge-to-Retail-DNA-Tests. 
 211. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102, 164.104 (2007). 
 212. The most common basis for inadmissibility is the lack of evidence of a chain of custody.  
See generally Anderlik, supra note 12, at 299–303. 
 213. See generally Sarah E. Gollust, Benjamin S. Wilfond & Sara Chandros Hull, Direct-to-
Consumer Sales of Genetic Services on the Internet, 5 GENETICS IN MED. 332 (2003) (describing 
survey of 105 websites). 
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analytical validity,214 clinical validity,215 clinical utility,216 misleading 
conclusions, and the lack of genetic counseling. 
3. The Publisher 
In this section, the term “publisher” is used to include any person or 
entity disclosing information in any form, including orally, in print, 
electronically, or by broadcast.  In the context of genetic stalking, 
publication presumably will be in a form to reach numerous people.  
Publishers of genetic information without consent might be liable for 
common law invasion of privacy.217  An important but difficult question 
is whether a statutory restriction on publication would be feasible or 
constitutional under the First Amendment. 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule applies only to three specific types of 
covered entities involved in the submission of electronic health claims 
data: health care providers, health plans, and health clearinghouses.218  
With certain exceptions for public health, law enforcement, and other 
uses, the Privacy Rule prohibits uses and disclosures of protected health 
information beyond treatment, payment, or health care operations 
without the written authorization of the individual.219  To take an extreme 
example of HIPAA’s possible applicability to genetic stalking, suppose a 
hospital (a covered entity) published in its weekly newsletter for patients, 
staff, and others the genetic or other health information about a particular 
patient (e.g., a celebrity patient) without the patient’s authorization.  
Such conduct clearly would violate the Privacy Rule.  It is unlikely that 
the hospital would be successful in asserting a First Amendment defense. 
                                                          
 214. “For DNA-based tests, analytical validity requires establishing the probability that a test 
will be positive when a particular sequence (analyte) is present (analytical sensitivity) and the 
probability that the test will be negative when the sequence is absent (analytical specificity).”  FINAL 
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING, PROMOTING SAFE AND EFFECTIVE GENETIC 
TESTING IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 2 (1997), available at http://www.genome.gov/10002404. 
 215. As stated by the Task Force:  
 Clinical validation involves establishing several measures of clinical performance 
including (1) the probability that the test will be positive in people with the disease 
(clinical sensitivity), (2) the probability that the test will be negative in people without the 
disease (clinical specificity), and (3) the probability that people with positive results will 
get the disease (positive predictive value (PPV)) and that people with negative results 
will not get the disease (negative predictive value). 
Id. 
 216. Clinical utility is “the balance between the benefits and harms of testing and the ensuing 
follow-up evaluation, treatment, or prevention.”  DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. REPORT, 
supra note 206, at 117. 
 217. See supra notes 51–129 and accompanying text. 
 218. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2007). 
 219. Id. § 164.502. 
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Suppose the HIPAA Privacy Rule were extended by Congress to be a 
comprehensive health privacy law, applicable to all uses and disclosures 
of protected health information by any individual or entity.220  Would it 
violate the new privacy law for a newspaper to publish genetic or other 
health information about a patient in the local hospital?  Should it matter 
how the newspaper obtained the information?  Should it matter what 
information is disclosed?  Should it matter why the information is being 
disclosed?  Should it matter if the patient is an ordinary resident of the 
community or an important elected official or candidate for a high 
political office?221 
Some statutory and regulatory measures to protect the privacy of 
individuals from publication of their health information will withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.222  At some point, however, the public’s interest 
in having access to the information will outweigh the individual’s right 
to privacy and come within the protections of the First Amendment.223  
Because of the difficulties in discerning and defining such a point, it is 
appropriate to consider the larger question of whether efforts to prevent 
genetic stalking and nonconsensual publication of genetic information 
should focus on the publishers of the information or should target other 
parties. 
4. The Websites 
Celebrity Genetics initiated the collection of the specimens, 
contracted to perform the genetic testing, and offered to sell the genetic 
test results.  Thus, Celebrity Genetics is more than a content-neutral 
                                                          
 220. See Letter from Simon P. Cohn, Chairman, National Committee on Vital and Health 
Statistics, to Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (June 
22, 2006) and accompanying report, Privacy and Confidentiality in the Nationwide Health 
Information Network, http://www.nevhs.hhs.gov/060622lt.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2008) 
(advocating such measure). 
 221. See generally Teneille R. Brown, Double Helix, Double Standards: Private Matters and 
Public People, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 295 (2008) (raising issue of whether there should be 
mandatory genetic testing of political candidates and publication of the results). 
 222. See Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
224 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1126 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (HIPAA is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under 
the Commerce Clause).  See generally Developments in the Law—The Law of Media, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 990, 1055–66 (2007) (analyzing media access to health information). 
 223. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (holding that the First Amendment 
protects publishers from civil liability for publishing information obtained illegally from 
nongovernmental sources as long as the publisher did not participate in the illegal activity and the 
matter is of public concern); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (holding that the 
First Amendment protects publishers from civil liability for disclosure of private facts when the 
information is lawfully obtained and truthfully reported); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, § 
11.3.5.5 (discussing the tort of public disclosure of private facts). 
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bulletin board or Internet service provider; it is a content provider.224  
From a regulatory standpoint, however, it is not clear whether Celebrity 
Genetics is engaged in any illegal conduct.  Under current law, Celebrity 
Genetics might be subject to civil liability for invasion of privacy,225 but 
criminal liability would be possible only if the website analyzed the 
samples in one of the twelve states that require express consent for 
genetic testing,226 and it is not clear that any of these state laws would 
apply. 
There are at least four ways in which the conduct of Celebrity 
Genetics could be regulated.  First, a law could be enacted to prohibit 
possession of a biological specimen with the intent to perform a genetic 
test without consent.  This approach, treating the specimen as 
contraband, is used in the U.K. Human Tissue Act.227  Second, assuming 
that obtaining human tissue without consent is made unlawful, a law also 
could be enacted to prohibit the solicitation of human tissue obtained 
without consent.  This prohibition on soliciting unlawful conduct would 
likely be upheld despite any First Amendment claims.228  Third, a law 
could be enacted to prohibit the sale of genetic information revealed by 
the testing of a biological sample obtained without consent.  Finally, a 
law could be enacted to require that Internet service providers block the 
sites of purveyors of genetic information, such as Celebrity Genetics.  
Such a law, however, is unlikely to withstand constitutional scrutiny.229 
C. A Preliminary Legislative Agenda 
Existing laws are inadequate to address the issue of genetic stalking.  
Because of the potentially national scope of the genetic stalking 
enterprise and the desirability of uniformity, congressional action should 
be undertaken to address the issue.  The following recommendations are 
                                                          
 224. See generally Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary 
Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 253 (2005) (discussing the regulation of Internet-related 
activity and liability of intermediaries). 
 225. See supra notes 65–129 and accompanying text. 
 226. See supra notes 152–59 and accompanying text. 
 227. Human Tissue Act 2004, c. 30 (Eng.).  See supra notes 187–97 and accompanying text. 
 228. In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, the Supreme Court 
held that the newspaper’s First Amendment rights were not infringed by a finding that its gender-
segregated want ad column violated the “aiding and abetting” provision of the city’s fair 
employment ordinance.  413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973).  In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission, the Court held that commercial speech concerning an unlawful activity 
may be regulated.  447 U.S. 557, 563–66 (1980). 
 229. See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 665 (E.D. Pa. 2004) 
(holding that the blocking provision of Pennsylvania’s Internet Child Pornography Act violated the 
First Amendment). 
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based on the assumption that a possible statute would be directed 
specifically and exclusively to unauthorized seizure, testing, and 
disclosing of genetic information.  Such an approach, often referred to as 
“genetic exceptionalism,”230 has been criticized by commentators231 but 
embraced by legislators.232 
In my view, genetic tests and genetic information generally should 
not be treated differently from other medical tests and information in the 
absence of a compelling reason.233  Conceptually, it would be better to 
regulate any individual or entity performing any biological testing of 
human specimens.  Nevertheless, it might be extraordinarily difficult to 
craft broad legislation that would ban any ill-advised, poorly performed, 
and nonconsensual medical testing without having unintended 
consequences such as prohibiting harmless biological analyses.234  
Furthermore, at the present time, the principal risk of testing biological 
specimens left on discarded objects is that the sample will be subjected to 
genetic testing.  It is possible that the development of new, non-genetic 
analytical techniques would require amendment of the statute. 
The following eight elements should be included in genetic stalking 
legislation. 
 
                                                          
 230. See Thomas H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and “Future Diaries”: Is Genetic 
Information Different from Other Medical Information?, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997) (“[T]he term 
genetic exceptionalism [means] roughly the claim that genetic information is sufficiently different 
from other kinds of health-related information that it deserves special protection or other exceptional 
measures.”). 
 231. See, e.g., James P. Evans & Wylie Burke, Genetic Exceptionalism.  Too Much of a Good 
Thing?, 10 GENETICS IN MED. 500, 500 (2008) (“[A]s genetic information increasingly becomes 
medically useful, it challenges the concept of genetic exceptionalism.”); Deborah Hellman, What 
Makes Genetic Discrimination Exceptional?, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 77, 78 (2003) (“Critics [of the laws 
prohibiting genetic discrimination] view them as unjustified and unwarranted.”); Sonia M. Suter, The 
Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. 
U.L. Q. 669 (2001) (“[G]enetics legislation creates inequalities that legislatures should find morally 
disturbing.”). 
 232. See supra notes 152, 165–80 and accompanying text. 
 233. See, e.g., Rothstein, Genetic Exceptionalism and Legislative Pragmatism, supra note 176, 
at 27–28 (“If genetic-specific laws are to be successful, three conditions must be met: (1) the term 
‘genetic’ must be defined clearly, logically, and with scientific precision; (2) there must be an 
efficient, low-cost way to separate genetic information from nongenetic information in health 
records; and (3) it must not only be possible to treat genetic information differently from other health 
information, but there must be a compelling reason to do so.”). 
 234. For example, a beauty salon somehow analyzing the hair of a customer before deciding 
which shampoo to use should not be subject to regulations designed for clinical laboratories. 
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1. Comprehensive Regulation of Laboratories 
All laboratories performing genetic testing of human specimens 
should be subject to federal regulation, and only tests certified as meeting 
acceptable scientific standards of analytical validity, clinical validity, and 
clinical utility should be approved. 
2. Regulatory Reorganization 
A new or reorganized regulatory authority should be created within 
the Department of Health and Human Services to oversee the approval of 
all new genetic tests for clinical, forensic, or commercial use, as well as 
to ensure compliance with good laboratory practices.  The professional 
organizations currently involved in the regulatory process should 
continue to have a defined advisory role in the new regulatory system.235 
3. Consent 
Verified,236 express,237 written consent of the individual whose 
biological specimen is tested should be required for all genetic testing 
not ordered by a health care professional with statutory authority to order 
a genetic test.  This requirement would apply to both “walk-in” and 
home-collection testing.  Genetic testing in health care settings would 
continue to be governed by established standards of medical practice, 
state medical practice acts, and professional accreditation standards.  
Written consent should not be required for all genetic testing in health 
care settings.238 
                                                          
 235. See supra notes 203–09 and accompanying text. 
 236. Verification is the process of demonstrating that the individual seeking the testing is, in 
fact, the person he or she claims to be.  It includes presenting picture identification or legal 
authorization for testing. 
 237. Express consent involves specifically agreeing to have a particular genetic test and 
understanding the nature and significance of the results. 
 238. With the expected increase of genetic testing in clinical settings, including 
pharmacogenomic analyses for drug prescribing and dosing, it would be burdensome and 
unnecessary to require detailed written consent for every genetic test.  At the present time, there is 
inadequate evidence of the need for legislation prohibiting any genetic test in the absence of a 
physician’s order.  Anonymous HIV and HCV testing using home test collection kits have been used 
successfully, and already-available home-collection genetic test kits should not necessarily be 
prohibited at this time.  For a further discussion, see generally Gail H. Javitt, Erica Stanley & Kathy 
Hudson, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests, Government Oversight, and the First Amendment: What 
the Government Can (and Can’t) Do to Protect the Public’s Health, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 251 (2004). 
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4. Testing Minor Children 
Any genetic testing of minor children to determine their parentage 
should be unlawful without the verified, express written consent of both 
legal parents, except pursuant to a court order.  Much of the current, 
Internet-based genetic testing without consent involves men with child-
support obligations who are suspicious of the paternity of their children.  
Curiosity parentage testing by noncustodial fathers has the potential to 
disrupt families and should be restricted.239  Genetic testing of minor 
children for health care purposes should be regulated by state laws 
dealing with parental authority to consent for the health care of minors. 
5. Specimens 
Subject to narrowly defined exceptions for law enforcement, national 
security, public health, and other specific purposes, no genetic testing 
should be permitted using a specimen other than a blood sample, a 
buccal swab, or another specimen collected using generally accepted 
laboratory practices, except where the testing is pursuant to a court order.  
The effect of this provision would be to prohibit the testing of chewing 
gum, cigarette butts, and other abandoned or pilfered items obtained 
without consent.  If testing is performed with consent, then only standard 
laboratory collection methods would be used. 
6. Solicitations 
Advertising or soliciting to perform any genetic testing service in 
violation of these requirements (e.g., testing abandoned objects, testing 
without consent) using any medium (including the Internet) or 
misrepresenting that any laboratory or genetic test has received the 
appropriate regulatory approval should be unlawful.240  Although 
aggressive enforcement of this provision is essential, it remains to be 
seen whether federal or state regulators would have the resources or 
political support to undertake such action. 
                                                          
 239. For additional recommendations on genetic testing of children to determine parentage, see 
Mark A. Rothstein, Translating Values and Interests into the Law of Parentage Determination, in 
GENETIC TIES AND THE FAMILY: THE IMPACT OF PATERNITY TESTING ON PARENTS AND CHILDREN, 
213 (Mark A. Rothstein et al. eds., 2005). 
 240. Such solicitation is prohibited by the U.K.’s Human Tissue Act.  See supra notes 187–97 
and accompanying text.  Unfortunately, there is the obvious problem of regulating off-shore testing 
laboratories advertising on the Internet.  The availability of remedies to deal with this problem is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
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7. Sale of Information 
Selling individually-identifiable genetic information without the 
verified, express, written consent of the individual should be unlawful,241 
except that the sale of an object containing or possibly containing genetic 
material should be permissible so long as the sale is not for the purpose 
of analyzing the genetic material without such consent of that individual.  
For example, the sale of a letter and envelope from a famous person 
should not be unlawful merely because there may be DNA on the 
envelope or stamp.242 
8. Sanctions 
A range of civil and criminal sanctions for violations should be 
provided, there should be stringent enforcement of the regulatory 
provisions, and individuals harmed by unlawful conduct in violation of 
the statute should have a private right of action for damages and other 
appropriate relief. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the futuristic film Gattaca, the female lead, played by Uma 
Thurman, surreptitiously obtains a hair of her romantic interest, the 
film’s protagonist, played by Ethan Hawke.243  She takes the hair to a 
laboratory that appears to specialize in the stealth genetic assessment of 
prospective mates.244  For a seemingly nominal fee, and in a matter of 
seconds, the laboratory presents her with the results of a full genome 
sequence analysis and an overall assessment of “9.3,” which, she is told, 
makes the sample source “quite a catch.”245  This aspect of the futuristic 
world portrayed in Gattaca is not science fiction; it is here today.  The 
only differences are that today’s genetic testing is not available “while 
                                                          
 241. It should be noted that mailing lists of people with various diseases, including genetic 
diseases, are commonly sold today.  See, e.g., ListFinder, http://listfinder.directmag.com/market? 
page=research/datacard&id=100590 (providing search results for various types of mailing lists) (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2008).  A discussion of whether such marketing activities should be prohibited is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 242. Additional exemptions might need to be included.  For example, it should not be unlawful 
to sell the analysis of the DNA derived from human remains hundreds or thousands of years old. 
 243. GATTACA (Columbia Pictures 1997). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
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you wait,”246 only genome-wide association analyses rather than full 
sequence data are commercially available today,247 and the genetic 
testing of the future presumably would be more accurate than what is 
commercially touted today.248 
Genetic stalking and voyeurism involving celebrities serve to draw 
attention to the issue, but the underlying privacy concerns of 
surreptitious genetic testing are anything but frivolous and have 
population-wide applicability.  Genetic information is among the most 
sensitive health and personal information about an individual.249  Without 
legislation prohibiting nonconsensual DNA analysis, human dignity and 
public civility will be irretrievably lost.  Society will have succeeded in 
reaching a level of “zero” privacy and it will not be easy or desirable to 
“get over it.” 
The recommendations for legislation in this Article address only one 
part of the wider problem of the lack of privacy protections for health 
information, including the commercial exploitation of health 
information.  For example, the United States does not have a 
comprehensive health privacy law;250 the closest thing to such a law is 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which has limited coverage,251 weak 
protections,252 and virtually no enforcement.253  The newly enacted 
                                                          
 246. One popular Internet-based company, 23andMe, promises results within six weeks of 
sample submission for only $399.  23andMe, http://www.23andme.com/store/ (last visited Nov. 5, 
2008).  23andMe cut its price from $999 to $399 in September 2008, whereas other leading 
companies, Navigenics and deCODE genetics, reportedly charge about $2,500 and $1,000, 
respectively.  Andrew Pollack, DNA Profile Provider Is Cutting Its Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 
2008, at C3.  These companies also reportedly have held cocktail parties in which all of the guests 
produce samples for testing.  Allen Salkin, When in Doubt, Spit It Out, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, 
at ST-2. 
 247. 23andMe, What is the difference between genotyping and sequencing?, http:// 
www.23andme.com/you/faqwin/sequencing/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 248. See W. Gregory Feero, Alan E. Guttmacher & Francis S. Collins, The Genome Gets 
Personal—Almost, 299 JAMA 1351, 1351 (2008) (“[T]he ability to interpret . . . DNA . . . still 
requires a great deal of intense research effort.”). 
 249. See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Keeping Your Genes Private, SCI. AM., Sept. 2008, at 64. 
 250. Id. at 67. 
 251. The Privacy Rule applies only to the following three classes of covered entities: health care 
providers, health plans, and health care clearinghouses.  45 C.F.R. § 160.102(a) (2008).  For a 
discussion about possibly increasing coverage in schools, see Letter from Simon Cohn, Chairman, 
National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics, to Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary of Health and 
Human Services (June 21, 2007), available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/pvcmemb.htm (June 21, 
2007 Letter on update to privacy laws and regulations required to accommodate NHIN data sharing 
practices). 
 252. See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, & Cyberspace: Protecting 
the Security of Electronic Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 344 (2007); Ilene N. Moore et 
al., Confidentiality and Privacy in Health Care from the Patient’s Perspective: Does HIPAA Help?, 
17 HEALTH MATRIX 215, 229–30 (2007); Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy 
and Confidentiality of Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 699–700 (2007); 
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federal genetic nondiscrimination law, GINA, does not address the use of 
genetic information in life insurance, disability insurance, long-term care 
insurance, mortgages, or numerous other contexts.254  The proposals in 
this Article are directed primarily at commercial uses of genetic 
information; they do not address the exploitation of genetic information 
that is not a direct sale, such as by posting genetic information on a 
commercial site supported by advertising revenues.  These and numerous 
other issues are beyond the scope of this Article. 
Today, in the health care setting, a genetic test intended to benefit the 
patient may be ordered only by a licensed physician with informed 
consent from the patient,255 the testing must be performed by a certified 
clinical laboratory,256 and the confidentiality of the results must be 
maintained in accordance with the HIPAA Privacy Rule.257  Should 
strangers be permitted to acquire an individual’s DNA sample on an 
inanimate object surreptitiously without any consent, arrange for an 
unregulated laboratory to perform genetic testing on the sample, and 
widely publish the results when the motivation is curiosity, commercial 
exploitation, or some other trivial, voyeuristic, or nefarious purpose? 
 
                                                                                                                       
Richard Sobel, The HIPAA Paradox: The Privacy Rule That’s Not, HASTINGS CTR. REP. no. 4, at 40 
(2007). 
 253. Kendra Gray, The Privacy Rule: Are We Being Deceived?, 11 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 
89, 103–09 (2008).  From the Privacy Rule’s compliance date of April 14, 2003, through July 31, 
2008, the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health and Human Services had received 
38,024 complaints.  Office for Civil Rights, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., http://www.hhs.gov/ 
ocr/privacy/enforcement/numbersglance0708.html#all (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).  Civil monetary 
penalties, as provided for in the Privacy Rule, had not been assessed in a single case, although on 
July 15, 2008, the Office for Civil Rights announced that a covered entity had signed a Corrective 
Action Plan with the government, including a $100,000 payment.  Office for Civil Rights, Dep’t of 
Health and Human Servs., HHS, Providence Health & Services Agree on Corrective Action Plan to 
Protect Health Information, July 17, 2008, http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2008pres/07/20080 
717a.html. 
 254. Rothstein, Putting the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act in Context, supra note 
173, at 655. 
 255. In eleven states, the consent must be in writing.  See supra note 152 (list of states, 
excluding Florida).  In one other state, consent must merely be express.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40 
(2008). 
 256. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 257. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102, 164.104 (2007). 
